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THE "ECHO-CHAMBER EFFECT" IN LEGAL
EDUCATION:
CONSIDERING FAMILY LAW CASEBOOKS
LYNNE MARIE KOHM' AND LYNN D. WARDLE2
When alternative viewpoints, opinions, and arguments are
significantly absent from any community, particularly a university or
law school community, it results in an "echo-chamber effect."3 The
lack of intellectual diversity results in the community hearing only
itself, hearing the ideas it wants and expects to hear, and hearing
nothing but echoes of the arguments, and viewpoints it prefers and
supports. Consequently, the discourse in that community becomes
narrower and more extreme as it is unchecked by ideas from outside
1. John Brown McCarty Professor of Family Law, Regent University School of Law. We
gratefully acknowledge the work of the UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC
POLICY in advance of and during the conference in research and reporting, and the valuable
discussions with our many prolife colleagues at the Minneapolis conference that have contributed
to this piece.
2. Bruce C. Hafen Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. The research assistance of Camille Borg and Savanah Lawrence is gratefully
acknowledged. This article is based in part on and stimulated by discussions in a conference
convened at the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis, Minnesota, November
15-16, 2011, where participants (including both of the authors) examined evidence of, considered
reasons for, and discussed possible remedies for bias against presentation of prolife facts, analysis,
and commentary in leading Family Law, Constitutional Law, and Bioethics and Law casebooks.
Both authors have written and are writing family law casebooks.
3. Nicholas DiFonzo, The Echo-Chamber Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/04/21/barack-obama-and-the-psychology-of-the-
birther-myth/the-echo-chamber-effect [hereinafter DiFonzo, The Echo-Chamber]; see also
Nicholas DiFonzo, Setting the Context: Understanding Pro-choice Attitudes and Pro-life
Persuasion, Presentation at the University of St. Thomas School of Law Conference of Pro-life
Efforts in the Legal Academy (Nov. 15, 2011) [hereinafter DiFonzo, Setting the Context] (author's
notes).
4. DiFonzo, The Echo-Chamber Effect, supra note 3; see also DiFonzo, Setting the Context,
supra note 3.
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the closed universe of the ideological group's "echo chamber."' The
resulting polarization fosters intolerance of other ideas and generates
extremism. For example, psychology professor Nicholas DiFonzo,
writing recently in the New York Times, described his research
showing that persons segregated by party affiliation into two groups
were more likely to believe malicious rumors about the other group.6
This resulted in "polarization," but "[w]hen the discussion groups
were mixed, this did not happen. Among like-minded people, it's
hard to come up with arguments that challenge the group consensus,
which means group members keep hearing arguments in only one
direction."'
Echo chambers are not good places to train lawyers. Lawyers
work in environments that, unlike echo chambers, are cacophonic,
where multiple competing ideas, assertions, arguments, and
viewpoints abound and vie for attention and influence. Thus, law
students need to learn how to be effective advocates in environments
in which many competing viewpoints are present and in which they
are trained to recognize, respect, and effectively deal with a plurality
of diverse viewpoints. However, if some family law casebooks mirror
the state of legal education today, some American law students are
being trained in echo chambers.
This essay briefly reviews the "classical" liberal
understanding of the importance of the clash of ideas in the search for
truth, and also reviews the "classical" or traditional view that such
intellectual diversity is especially important in the academy and in
legal education. Next, it succinctly examines evidence that an erosion
of this value has occurred in American universities and law schools
in particular. Then it discusses data from a review of six popular
family law casebooks that suggests that there is a profound "echo
effect" in law school teaching about abortion issues in family law.' It
5. "The greatest danger of the echo chambers is unjustified extremism. So it's a well-known
fact that if you get a group of people who tend to think something, after they talk to each other,
they end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before," The Echo Chamber
Revisited: Transcript, ON MEDIA (June 17, 2011), http://www.onthemedia.org/2011 /jun/I7/echo-
chamber-revisited/transcript (quoting Professor Cass Sunstein).
6. DiFonzo, The Echo-Chamber Effect, supra note 3.
7. Id
8. Asking why there are no materials on certain topics, features, or viewpoints in some law
school classes and casebooks is not a new concern in the legal academy. See generally S.
Chesterfield Oppenheim, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Sales, 46 HARV. L. REv. 542, 544
(1933) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON & WILLIAM E. MCCURDY, A SELECTION OF CASES ON
THE LAW OF SALES (1932)).
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concludes with some ideas about how the echo effect can be avoided
and remedied in law schools, particularly in the context of addressing
abortion issues and other controversial topics in teaching family law.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE IDEAL OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM IN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION
Once upon a time, lawyers and legal education in the United
States celebrated and were committed to the belief that the clash of
ideas was the best method to determine controverted truths. One of
the most eloquent expressions of this ideal was articulated by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes in his powerful dissent in Abrams v. United
States, declaring:
If you have no doubt of your premises or your power,
and want a certain result with all your heart, you
naturally express your wishes in law, and sweep away
all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to
indicate that you think the speech impotent, . . . or that
you doubt either your power or your premises. But
when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe . .. that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any
rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if
not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.
While that experiment is part of our system, I think
that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country.'
9. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis
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Holmes' dissent rested in great part upon the philosophical principle
articulated by Professor Harold Laski, who wrote: "It is 'in the clash
of ideas that we shall find the means of truth. There is no other
safeguard of progress."' 10
The intellectual pedigree of the clash of ideas traces back
through the Reformation when an entire socio-religious movement
ultimately altered all religious thought and transformed social and
legal relations throughout Europe and the European colonies. This
clash of ideas derived its name from the insistence upon "protesting"
ideas and positions that it considered to be erroneous." But
challenging is not merely a Protestant penchant. Many intellectual
traditions in law and secular thought derive from the clash of ideas
that occur in religious communities.12 Indeed, the vigorous exchange
of contesting ideas characterizes all major Christian and Jewish
traditions and also stimulated Age of Enlightenment secularism. In
fact, democratic liberalism (including most prominently the
American Constitution) is based upon the first principles of respect
for the individual, individual rights, and the organization of
individuals into social and political units. Within those units, a
added). In Abrams, five Russian Jewish immigrants had been arrested in 1918 for distributing
materials opposing the U.S. intervention against the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Abrams, 250
U.S. at 618-19. They were prosecuted under the recently enacted (1917) Sedition Act; all were
convicted and sentenced to terms of between fifteen and twenty years imprisonment. Jeffrey
O'Connell & Thomas E. O'Connell, The Rise and Fall (and Rise Again?) of Harold Laski, 55
MD. L. REv. 1384, 1401 n.84 (1996) (reviewing ISAAC KRAMNICK & BARRY SHEERMAN,
HAROLD LASKI: A LIFE ON THE LEFT 126 (1993)). Their appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States was unsuccessful, and their convictions were affirmed over the dissent of Justices
Holmes and Brandeis. Their dissenting opinion "helped shape much of the future First
Amendment adjudication of free speech." Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
10. KRAMNICK & SHEERMAN, supra note 9, at 127.
11. See generally John Witte, Jr., Prophets, Priests, and Kings: John Milton and the
Reformation of Rights and Liberties in England, 57 EMORY L.J. 1527, 1593 (2008) ("The very
nature of being a Protestant reformer, Milton argued, is to protest, to challenge, to reform, to fight
falsehood with truth. The Protestant Reformation was born in this dialectical struggle about the
most fundamental truths of Scripture and nature. The Protestants' strongest weapons in this
struggle were their published books. Their best tactics were their open clashes of ideas with
Catholics and with each other. And their wisest conclusion was to call their followers to continue
the struggle, to be constantly at work at further discovery and reform.").
12. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Samuel Flaks, Beyond Rules, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 297, 300,
330 (2010) ("This cycle theory of jurisprudence was the direct outgrowth of the internal debate
between Reform and Orthodox Jews over Jewish law."); Lynn D. Wardle, The Constitution as
Covenant, BYU STUD., Summer 1987, at 11, 20-22 (1987) (explaining that political ideas about
social compact mirrored prior religious ideas about the need to organize by covenant); see also
Frank S. Ravitch, Religious Freedom and Israeli Law, 57 DRAKE L. REv. 879, 891 (2009)
(discussing aspects of how internal Jewish debate has influenced secular/legal debate on such
issues as what it means to be a "Jewish" state, child abuse reporting, etc.).
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government of the governed operates through the ordered and
deliberate clash of competing individual viewpoints." Democracy is
inseparable from the principle of the clash of ideas, for such debate
and discussion precede and are the necessary foundation for the
development of democratic consensus. For example, the great
challenge of McCarthyism to academic and broader political freedom
in the 1950s lay in the suppression of ideas that were deemed
meritless, dangerous, and politically unacceptable (and in the
marginalization, oppression, or exclusion of academics and others
who discussed them).14
A. THE CLASH OF IDEAS AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM GENERALLY
Inviting, cultivating, and providing a clash of ideas is the
main raison d'dtre for academic freedom.'" The clash of ideas
principle lies at the heart of the concept of academic freedom. In this
country, the original justification for academic freedom was
recognition of its fundamental role as a truth-seeking device.16 One
advantage of the clash of ideas in the academy is that:
13. As the historian Clinton Rossiter observed: "American democracy owes its greatest debt
to colonial Protestantism for the momentum it gave to the growth of individualism. The
Reformation . . . did as much as the rise of capitalism to spread the doctrine of individualism."
CLINTON L. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 40 (1953).
14. Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom
in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1276-78 (1988). See generally JANE SANDERS, COLD WAR ON
THE CAMPUS: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, 1946-1964 (1979);
ELLEN SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES (1986); GEORGE
R. STEWART, THE YEAR OF THE OATH: THE FIGHT FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (1950).
15. This assertion explained:
Academic freedom developed before modem First Amendment
jurisprudence. It was created neither by courts nor by legislatures. As a
system of practices and values, academic freedom developed under the aegis
of the American Association of University Professors during the early years
of the twentieth century. Designed to insulate scholars from the political and
religious prejudices of powerful lay trustees, it accommodated competing
needs for intellectual freedom and disciplinary accountability through peer
review and tenure, which both sanctioned careful evaluation by peers and
sharply limited it by others. The core ethical concept was that a scholar could
research, teach, and publish without retaliation for the political tendencies of
her work.
J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About the "Four
Freedoms" of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 931 (2006) (emphasis added).
16. See Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV 461, 476 (2005); see also
Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Corporatization of Academic Research: Whose Interests Are Served, 38
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[G]etting arguments out in the open, testing these
arguments in public debate, and evaluating the
implications of various ideas, public dialogue can help
change social attitudes and create consensus as one set
of ideas gradually gains a majority position. . . .
[P]ublic dialogue can spur consensus through the clash
of ideas."
The virtue of the clash of ideas in the process of creating and
enacting legislation (as well as applying and interpreting law) is well
recognized.
Ironically, academic freedom may be threatened by educators
who see themselves as guardians of institutional reputation,
progressive causes, or fashionable ("the right") views." While
academic freedom includes other elements and is implicated by a
broad range of practices, the cornerstone of academic freedom is
preservation of an atmosphere in which presentation of all viewpoints
is encouraged and promoted. This especially includes diverse,
unpopular, and unorthodox ideas or arguments. Suppression and
elimination of relevant but unpopular interpretations, evaluations,
viewpoints, and conclusions is anathema to the concept of academic
freedom. As Justice Frankfurter noted in his eminent concurrence in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire:
'In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely
a means to an end. A university ceases to be true to its
own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or
any sectional interest. A university is characterized by
the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of
Socrates-'to follow the argument where it leads.'
This implies the right to examine, question, modify or
reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and
AKRON L. REv. 759, 762 (2005).
17. Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 339 (1998).
18. See generally Stuart N. Brotman, Executive Branch Communications Policymaking:
Reconciling Function and Form with the Council of Communications Advisers, 42 FED. COMM.
L.J. 51, 64-65 (1989).
19. See generally Philo Hutcheson, The Disemboweled University: Online Knowledge and
Academic Freedom, AAUP J. ACAD. FREEDOM (2011), http://www.academicfreedomjoumal.org/
VolumeTwo/Hutcheson.pdf.
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hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an
immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a
university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to
add and revise facts in relation to an accepted
framework, but to be ever examining and modifying
the framework itself.
'Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on
the basis of observation and experiment are the
necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific
knowledge. A sense of freedom is also necessary for
creative work in the arts which, equally with scientific
research, is the concern of the university.
It is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which
there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a
university-to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.'20
The rise of academic freedom in American universities was fostered
by Protestant institutions of higher education in the mid- and late-
nineteenth century. 2' Like John D. Rockefeller, the key benefactor of
the University of Chicago, the shapers of American universities in the
nineteenth century generally "accepted the premise that a true
university would have to allow freedom of expression and that this
principle would have to apply to a Christian university as well."2 2 As
Rockefeller's personal secretary, Frederick T. Gates, wrote in
response to a complaint about an anthropology faculty member:
20. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10-12 (1957) ("a statement of a conference
of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand,
including A. v. d. S. Centlivres and Richard Feetham, as Chancellors of the respective
universities")).
21. See generally GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 3
(1994) ("In the late nineteenth century, when American universities took their shape, the
Protestantism of the major northern denominations acted as a virtual religious and cultural
establishment. This establishmentarian outlook was manifested in American universities . . . ").
Marsden also states that while elements of the principles of academic freedom "could be found
among the Jeffersonians and at nineteenth-century German universities, the phrase, as well as
most of its twentieth-century applications, was hardly older than the century itself." Id. at 296,
68-100.
22. Id. at 245.
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I do not know of any way in the world by which we
can arrive at the truth except by letting everybody
speak out what he believes to be the truth within the
limits of public morality. . . . The fact that such an
institution is founded by private money or
denominational money seems to me to make no sort of
difference and must not be allowed to interfere in the
smallest degree with this freedom of inquiry, freedom
of opinion, and freedom of utterance.
Thus, "[a]cademic freedom, as originally defined in the United
States[,] assumed a universal science that required only open-minded
free inquiry to flourish."23 During the nineteenth century, "the
freedom for the guild of professors independently to pursue its
inquiries, publications, and teachings-became a symbol for an
emerging ideal of academic freedom."24 According to the influential
1915 Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom, adopted by the
fledgling American Association of University Professors, the
tolerance for presentation of divergent viewpoints was critical "to
promote inquiry and advance the sum of human knowledge" as well
as in instruction of students. "[F]reedom to say what one believed
was essential to the integrity of teaching," for "it was 'better for
students to think about heresies than to not think at all.' 25
B. THE IDEAL OF FOSTERING THE PRESENTATION OF DIVERSE
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW SCHOOL
The inclusive, intellectual pluralism model of academic
freedom initially received a warm welcome in American law schools
where students were prepared for the adversarial-method-based legal
system, in which the graduates of law school would practice their
professional skills as lawyers. Thus, the clash of ideas principle has
long lay in the heart of the most important elements of the American
23. Id. at 434.
24. Id. at 153.
25. Id. at 307; see also id. at 308 ("The AAUP committee recognized that academic freedom
could not be unlimited but argued that there should always be a presumption in its favor ...
Restraints were sometimes necessary . . . against extreme, scandalous, or irresponsible
statements."). Yet, it was widely accepted that "traditional religious viewpoints had a negative
effect on 'the common good.' They could be tolerated, but only as exceptions to the rule." Id at
312.
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legal system and the substance of the pedagogy of American
jurisprudence. As Dean Steven R. Smith put it: "Challenging,
unpopular and new ideas cannot thrive unless academic freedom
exists and can be relied on within the law school."26
That clash-of-ideas principle once was (or at least seemed to
be) the cornerstone of American legal education. Even today, there
still is at least nominal recognition of the need for a law school
environment that fosters the expression of competing viewpoints
(albeit often ideologically applied). Loss of intellectual diversity in
the law school environment diminishes legal education. As Dean
Smith wrote: "Successful law school instruction relies on the open
and free exchange and clash of ideas."27 Likewise, even before he
became a law school dean, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky advocated a
"big tent" (many audiences) metaphor and insisted that law
professors have a duty to engage in the clash-of-ideas scholarship in
order to promote law reform:
An analogy can be drawn to one of the reasons that
freedom of speech is protected as a fundamental right:
the belief that the exchange of ideas furthers the
search for truth. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
invoked the powerful metaphor of the "marketplace of
ideas" and wrote that "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
26. Steven R. Smith, Gresham's Law in Legal Education, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
171, 199 (2008).
27. Id.; "[D]iversity of ideas . . . is fundamental to the American system," Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. V. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 290 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and "the examination of
diverse viewpoints" is necessary to enable law schools as well as law students "to innovate in a
world where the practice of law and legal education [are] rapidly changing." Alyssa
Thurston, Addressing the "Emerging Majority": Racial and Ethnic Diversity in Law
Librarianship in the Twenty-First Century, 104 Law Libr. J. 359, 364 (2012). As Dean Johnson
noted: "[T]he 'skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be development
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints." Kevin R.
Johnson, The Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law Schools: One Dean's
Perspective, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1549, 1553 (2011) (emphasis added). See also Cruz Reynoso &
Cory Amron, Diversity in Legal Education: A Broader View, A Deeper Commitment, 52 J. Legal
Educ. 491, 491 (2002) ("'Diversity' is prominent among the values law schools embrace today.");
Hilary Sommerlad, Minorities, Merit, and Misrecognition in the Globalized Profession, 80
Fordham L. Rev. 2481, 2510 (2012) (globalization has "made diversity a key criterion for
establishing the legitimacy of social institutions.").
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out." The argument is that truth is most likely to
emerge from the clash of ideas.
John Stuart Mill expressed this view when he
wrote that the "peculiar evil of silencing the
expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the
human race, posterity as well as the existing
generation-those who dissent from the opinion, still
more than those who hold it." He said that an opinion
may be true and may be wrongly suppressed by those
in power, or a view may be false and people are
informed by its refutation. Justice Brandeis embraced
this view when he said that the "fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones" and that "[i]f there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence."
Although there are strong criticisms of the
marketplace of ideas metaphor, the basic notion is that
the exchange of ideas advances understanding. This is
what should be expected of legal scholarship: that it
contributes original ideas and advances understanding.
Again, this is not to say that this is the only type of
writing with value; rather just it is a type that should
be required of all faculty members.2 8
Whether transactional or litigation attorneys, lawyers practice
in an environment in which there are always at least two sides (and
often many more than that) that must be considered. Adequate
transactional planning requires the attorney to consider the
transaction from many different perspectives to properly prepare for
and address the major contingencies that may arise in the course of
the transaction, enterprise, or relationship. Likewise, trial and
appellate lawyers must perceive, grasp, and respond to not only the
opposing positions taken and arguments made by opposing parties
but other alternatives that the court may raise. Attorneys live
professionally in an environment of interest, intellectual, and
positional pluralism; interest, informational, and interpretative
28. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, In Defense of the Big Tent: The Importance of
Recognizing the Many Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 34 TULSA L.J. 667, 675-76 (1999).
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diversity characterizes the soil in which their professional practices
are grown.
"Law school constantly deals with the most controversial
subjects because almost all of them have important legal aspects."29
Lawyers encounter and must be prepared to respond to the entire
range of ideological positions on all issues of importance in order to
represent their clients well.3 0 Thus, law students also must encounter
and must be prepared to respond to the whole spectrum of ideological
positions regarding social and political controversies in order to begin
to acquire the skills to practice law effectively. Law students need to
learn to be comfortable working at top performance levels in an
environment in which they hear and must analyze and respond to
ideas and positions that they dislike and disbelieve. Preparation of
law students to practice their profession in that environment requires
that they be regularly and constantly exposed to practicing and
developing their skills of advocacy in that kind of an intellectually
pluralistic and dynamic setting.
There is another pedagogical dimension to promoting and
protecting the clash of ideas in law school. It reflects the
methodology of the law. The process of inviting, encouraging,
receiving, assessing, providing, and protecting diverse, competing
viewpoints is the essence of the legal method. The lawyer's work
environment is the adversarial system; that system is predicated upon
basic notions of procedural fairness that guarantee all parties the
opportunity to present their cases, their claims, their defenses, their
positions, their evidence, their arguments, and their challenges to
their opponents' positions, evidence, and arguments. Preparation of
law students to practice their professional skills requires that they
also develop a commitment to those qualities of the adversary
system. Law students need to learn to be as committed to defending
the adversarial methods and processes as they are to promoting any
particular substantive idea or position. They must adopt the principle
of Voltaire summarized by the well-known epigram: "'I disapprove
of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.'" 1
29. Smith, supra note 26, at 199.
30. See generally Mark C. Alexander, Law-Related Education: Hope for Today's Students,
20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 57, 67-68 (1993) (reviewing the growth of law schools in the 1970s,
spurred by recognition of the need to prepare the rising generation to deal with a host of "crises
rooted in the clash of ideas").
31. STEPHEN G. TALLENTYRE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907). This quote is often
attributed to Voltaire but, as one online commentator notes, because of quote marks around the
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Legal education that is lacking or restricted in exposing
students to a multiplicity of diverse positions that are strongly
advocated deprives the students of the opportunity to develop and test
essential professional skills and qualities. Ironically, persons in echo
chambers are more vulnerable to opposing viewpoints than persons
who live in intellectually diverse communities because, when they
hear arguments for alternative positions, they are taken by surprise
and are unprepared to effectively analyze and refute or resist them,
having been raised in the sanitized environment of ideological
sameness.3 Thus, the loss of intellectual diversity because of the
liberal-left dominance of the legal academy and exclusion of
alternative (conservative-right) information and arguments
substantially disagreeing with the liberal viewpoints du jour produces
law students who graduate from echo chambers and are not well-
prepared to be excellent attorneys.
One memorable example of how the echo-chamber effect
disserves professional ability that I personally observed occurred in
litigation about abortion regulation in Utah in the early 1990s. In
1991 the Utah legislature enacted a comprehensive new abortion
statute in the interlude between Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services," when it appeared that the Court might be moving in the
direction of upholding more substantial restrictions of abortion,34 and
before Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,15
when the Court reaffirmed Roe and adopted a new framework, giving
courts a vague new standard allowing the judiciary to continue to
liberally invalidate laws regulating abortion. The 1991 Utah
legislation permitted abortion at any time only if "necessary to save
the [mother's] life," "to prevent grave damage to the pregnant
woman's medical health," or "to prevent the birth of a child that
original publication of these words, they are often attributed to Voltaire, though Hall was not
actually quoting him but summarizing his attitude with the expression. The statement was widely
popularized when misattributed to Voltaire as a "Quotable Quote" in Reader's Digest (June 1934),
but in response to the misattribution, Hall had been quoted in Saturday Review (II May 1935), p.
13, as stating: I did not mean to imply that Voltaire used these words verbatim and should be
surprised if they are found in any of his works. They are rather a paraphrase of Voltaire's words
in the Essay on Tolerance- "Think for yourselves and let others enjoy the privilege to do so too. "
Evelyn Beatrice Hall, WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/EvelynBeatriceHall (last
modified Sept. 15, 2012) (emphasis in original).
32. DiFonzo, The Echo-Chamber Effect, supra note 3.
33. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
34. See Lynn D. Wardle, "Time Enough ": Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and the
Prudent Pace ofJustice, 41 FLA. L. REv. 881, 883 (1989).
35. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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would be born with grave defects." 6 Additionally, an abortion could
be performed during the first twenty weeks of gestation in cases of
rape or incest;" further informed consent requirements also were
enacted, including disclosure of the facts of fetal development (most
of these provisions are still in effect)." The 1991 Utah legislation
made Utah one of only four states (Louisiana, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Utah) to enact legislation directly challenging the Roe
doctrine of abortion-on-demand.
The abortion industry-movement quickly challenged the 1991
Utah abortion legislation, hiring a highly celebrated lawyer as the
lead trial attorney representing them in the challenge.3 9 The lead
lawyer representing the state, Mary Anne Wood, had been a brilliant
and tough law professor at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at
Brigham Young University for many years, having recently left the
academy to start one of the best law firms in the state. Wood was
very knowledgeable about abortion, well-prepared, tenacious, alert,
and articulate. 4 0 The judge, Judge Thomas Green, had assumed the
bench after a long career in litigation and bar-organization activities
that had him interacting with the best lawyers and law firms in the
nation. Neither attorney Wood nor Judge Green was overawed by the
famous lawyer for the plaintiffs. 4 1 Because of the echo-chamber
effect, it may be possible that the abortion-industry attorney might
have grown accustomed to hearing nothing but accolades, to winning
easily, or to prevailing on trite arguments that had succeeded
elsewhere (in the echo chamber) without having truly been
challenged by well-prepared lawyers or tough-minded judges. Thus,
36. See 1991 Utah Laws Ch. 2, S.B. 4 (codified as UTAH CODE § 76-7-302 (1992)).
37. Id
38. Id.
39. That lawyer had won many cases for the pro-abortion-choice cause and had received
great accolades. She walked in the courtroom in Utah having lived and worked in the pro-choice
echo chamber so long that it seemed like she thought that all she had to do was show up in the
remote Utah courtroom and the opponents would wither and the court would swoon at her feet.
She quickly learned otherwise.
40. Wood was the co-author with one of the co-authors of this piece of a book reviewing the
history of the regulation of abortion in America and critiquing the Roe v. Wade decision and
precedents. See LYNN D. WARDLE & MARY ANNE WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION
(1982).
41. In the first hearing, Wood was so well prepared and impressive that the visiting pro-
choice celebrity lawyer almost seemed to reel and stagger, as if dazed, under the barrage of
effective preparation and presentation by the lawyer defending the statute. Moreover, the plight of
plaintiffs' counsel was compounded by a no-nonsense, impartial judge who didn't race to rescue
the plaintiffs with soothing, wink-wink, nudge-nudge questions or comments for their stumbling
counsel.
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initially, the quality and success of plaintiffs' lawyering did not
measure up to the impressive reputation. In fact, Utah won in the U.S.
district court (but later lost at the Tenth Circuit, after Casey was
decided).42
Fostering the presentation of diverse perspectives in law
school works to prepare future attorneys to be most prepared at the
outset of any case they face. Lawyers are not well taught when
trained in echo chamber-like environments without experience in
confronting competing viewpoints.
II. THE DEMISE OF THE "CLASH OF VIEWPOINTS" IDEAL IN
AMERICAN HIGHER AND LEGAL EDUCATION
In some ways, the current attitude of American academic,
especially legal academic, communities turns Voltaire's epigram
upside. The prevailing intolerance of politically unpopular positions
(especially relating to abortion and same-sex marriage) in some law
schools, and in most family law casebooks (at least about some
subjects) reflects a view that is characterized by Eugene Volokh's
word-play on the Voltaire-ian principle: "I disagree with what you
say, and I'll riot if you say it."43 This abandonment or distortion of the
original academic freedom ideal probably has not occurred as a
matter of widespread conspiracy and deliberate ideological hostility,
but as Professor Marsden concluded, "[W]hat we typically find are
unintended consequences of decisions that in their day seemed
largely laudable, or at least unavoidable."44
42. See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 880 (D. Utah 1992) (invalidating law
prohibiting abortion before twenty weeks gestation unless necessary to save mother's life, prevent
grave damage to her health, pregnancy as a result of rape or incest, or fetus has grave defects),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 518 U.S. 137 (1996), remanded,
102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1274 (1997); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 828
F.Supp. 1544 (D. Utah. 1993), rev'd, 61 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1995), remanded, 914 F.Supp. 484
(D. Utah), amended by 920 F.Supp. 1202 (D. Utah 1996); Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt,
844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994), rev'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 75 F.3d 564 (10th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1019 (1996) (invalidating law prohibiting abortion after twenty
weeks gestation unless necessary to save mother's life, to prevent grave damage to her health, or if
fetus has grave defects).
43. Eugene Volokh, I Disagree with What You Say, and I'll Riot If You Say It, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 8, 2006, 11:08 AM), http://volokh.com/posts/l141880899.shtml (commenting
on a news report about Muslims in a city in France rioting and setting fire to a car and garbage
cans in protest of the performance of Voltaire's play, FANATICISM, or MAHOMET THE PROPHET);
see also Andrew Higgins, Muslims Ask French to Cancel 1741 Play by Voltaire, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE (Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06065/666058.stm.
44. MARSDEN, supra note 21, at 8.
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Sadly, much of the American academy, including many law
schools and legal academics, have largely abandoned the traditional
clash of viewpoints ideal, replacing it with a clear preference for
expressions that are deemed "reasonable and progressive." These law
schools and legal academics have associated bias against the
presentation of positions that are considered antiquated or moralistic,
as judged by contemporary popularity measures. Today, "[tihe
ideological bias of the contemporary American university fosters an
intellectual ecosystem that is clearly hostile toward the expression of
culturally conservative viewpoints . . . ."45 As one review of legal
literature about same-sex marriage noted in 1996:
The biased academic environment is the result of "the
success of the left in grounding itself within American
educational and cultural institutions since 1960."
WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DEVALUING OF AMERICA
163 (1994) ("Prestigious, selective, leading
universities . . . have a tendency in our time to show a
liberal bias."); see RUSSELL JACOBY, THE LAST
INTELLECTUALS: AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE AGE OF
ACADEME 124 (1987) ("[N]ever before in American
history did so many left intellectuals seek and find
university positions [as in the 1960s]."); see also id. at
112-90 (describing the 1960s and subsequent leftist
dominance of American universities); EDWARD E.
ERICSON, JR., RADICALS IN THE UNIVERSITY (1975)
(tracking the development of the "New Left"
movement from students of the 1960s to current
members of the academy); cf RICHARD H. PELLS, THE
LIBERAL MIND IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE at vii, 120-
21, 287-95 (2d ed. 1989) (while many universities in
the McCarthy era got caught up in reactionary
anticommunism and became more conservative,
leading leftist intellectuals continued in academia);
Bruce Robbins, The Grounding of Intellectuals, in
INTELLECTUALS: AESTHETICS POLITICS ACADEMICS at
ix (Bruce Robbins ed., 1990); THOMAS SOWELL,
INSIDE AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE DECLINE, THE
45. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. REv. 1, 20.
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DECEPTION, THE DOGMAS 174-88 (1993). See
generally ALLAN BLOOK, THE CLOSING OF THE
AMERICAN MIND (1987) (critically discussing "the
dismantling of the structure of rational inquiry" in
American universities in the 1960s); DINESH
D'SOUZA, ILLEBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF
RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 17-18 (1991) (discussing
the effects of liberal influences on the new generation
of university professors); JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE
WARS 211 (1991) ("[M]ost people would regard
higher education in America as a bastion of liberal
secularity. . . . The cultural ethos of the modem
university clearly favors a progressivist agenda.").4 6
A recent empirical study found that twenty-nine percent of the
law professors in the top twenty-one law schools in the United States
are "politically active" (meaning that they donated over $200 to
federal campaigns in the last five election cycles preceding the year
2005); 47 of those politically active law professors, seventy-nine
percent were exclusively Democratic donors while only thirteen
percent were exclusively Republican donors (a six-to-one ratio). 11
Professor James Davison Hunter has described the "grammar
of hostility," "the drift toward bigotry," and "the specter of
intolerance," which characterize the expressions, tactics, and
mindsets of some educated proponents of "progressive" liberal
positions, as well as proponents of some conservative positions. This
is seen particularly in the contemporary "culture wars" over issues
such as homosexuality. 49 Professor Hunter argues that this intolerance
and use of extremely hostile language characterizes both sides of "not
46. Wardle, supra note 45, at 20 n.73; see also BERTELL OLLMAN & EDWARD VERNOFF,
THE LEFT ACADEMY: MARXIST SCHOLARSHIP ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES 1 (1982) ("a Marxist
cultural revolution" occurring in American universities); BRUCE ROBBINS, Introduction: The
Grounding of Intellectuals, in INTELLECTUALS: AESTHETICS, POLITICS AND ACADEMICS, at ix,
ix-xxv (Bruce Robbins ed., 1990); DAVID HOROWITZ, BATTLE FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM 6
(2003),
http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org/filedownload/6/battle+for+academic+booklet.pdf.
47. John 0. McGinnis, Matthew A. Schwartz & Benjamin Tisdell, The Patterns and
Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1177
(2005).
48. Id The article also reviewed and found similar patterns (pro-liberal distribution) in
statements signed by professors and amicus brief filings. Id at 1174, 1193-94.
49. Wardle, supra note 45, at 20 n.74 (citing JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS 155
(1991)); see also id. at 140-43, 146, 148-49, 153-54, 188-92.
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only subterranean friction in public culture but open conflict" over
abortion, homosexuality, and similar social issues. 0
The bias in published articles on controversial social policy
issues has frequently been noted.' The imbalance in published
articles on various sides of issues, such as abortion and same-sex
marriage, reflects an imbalance in the course materials, and a bias
and distortion of discussion that seems to be happening in the law
school classroom as well. As Professor McGinnis and his co-authors
note, "liberal political ideology . . . dominate[s] the elite legal
academy,"52 and there is a rich supply of published liberal intellectual
ideas. However, "opposing views do not easily receive the academic
or intellectual attention they deserve."53
[T]he apparent lack of political or ideological diversity
at elite American law schools may have implications
for the professed use of affirmative action at these
schools to further "viewpoint diversity." . . . [L]aw
schools that offer "viewpoint diversity" as a
justification for affirmative action, but are unwilling to
take such steps to hire conservatives, are perhaps
using a convenient and selective definition of
"viewpoint diversity" that may itself be ideologically
driven. We also suggest that true viewpoint diversity
within law school communities is advanced (at least)
as much by ideological diversification as it is by
ethnic diversification . . . .54
The philosophical imbalance in the American academy,
particularly the legal academy, and the resulting diminution of
clashing ideas and viewpoints may be a manifestation of Gresham's
50. Id. at 135, 137-40, 144, 150-52.
51. Id. at 116-20 (discussing the sixty-nine to one numerical imbalance in law review articles
favoring and opposing same-sex marriage); see also Lynn D. Wardle, Comparative Perspectives
on Adoption of Children by Cohabiting, Nonmarital Couples and Partners, 63 ARK. L. REV. 31,
100-12 (2010) (listing eighty-four articles favoring same-sex partner adoption, forty neutral
articles, and two pieces opposing such adoptions published in twenty months).
52. McGinnis, Schwartz & Tisdell, supra note 47, at 1171.
53. Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to "Principles and Prejudice": Marriage and the
Realization that Principles Win over Political Will, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293, 309 (1996).
54. McGinnis, Schwartz & Tisdell, supra note 47, at 1198; see also id. at 1203 ("[L]aw
schools that have few conservatives, but are publicly committed to the proposition that viewpoint
diversity should be a goal in the hiring or admissions process, may open themselves to charges of
intellectual inconsistency and special pleading.").
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Law-that "bad money drives out good money."5 Professor Smith
suggests that "a broader form of Gresham's Law can operate when
the intrinsic and nominal values of something can be separated." 6
Applied to academic freedom, the effect of Gresham's Law occurs
when formal commitment to the promotion of the clash of ideas (such
as commitment in written policies, breast-beating protestations of
commitment to that value, and no- or low-cost actions, including
invoking academic freedom and intellectual diversity to justify
support for or expression of one's preferred positions on
controversial subjects) can be separated from substantive
commitment to that value (working to consistently include
viewpoints one dislikes or advocates or articles one disagrees with,
especially that have substance that might persuade persons away
from one's own viewpoint and policy preferences). Eventually the
"bad money" of formal and nominal commitment to academic
freedom, intellectual diversity, and the importance of clashing ideas
will dominate and drive out the "good money" of the actual practice
of intellectual inclusion, pluralism, and diversity that produces the
clash of ideas sought by the ideal.
What has happened in legal education in America is but one
manifestation of the greater trend in higher education in the United
States. As George Marsden has described in some detail, the
apparently inclusive nineteenth-century Protestant concept of
academic freedom eventually destroyed itself. "Ironically, . . .
Protestant universalism (catholicity, if you will) was one of the forces
that eventually contributed to the virtual exclusion of religious
perspectives from the most influential centers of American
intellectual life."" By the last quarter of the twentieth century,
academic freedom in American universities had morphed into "a
basis for discrimination against religious viewpoints."" Professor
Marsden concludes that:
55. Smith, supra note 26, at 171 n.3 ("A good statement, technically, is that bad or less
desirable currency tends to drive out (or circulate instead of) good or more desirable currency if
both exchange for the same price (e.g., because of legal tender laws).").
5 6. Id.
57. MARSDEN, supra note 21, at 5.
58. Id. at 434.
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In the nineteenth century the Protestant establishment
became informal and declared itself nonsectarian.
Today nonsectarianism has come to mean the
exclusion of all religious concerns . . . . [O]nly purely
naturalist viewpoints are allowed a serious academic
hearing . . . . [G]roups who do not match the current
national ideological norms are forced to fend for
themselves outside of the major spheres of cultural
influence. Today, almost all religious groups, no
matter what their academic credentials, are on the
outside of this educational establishment . ..
The clash of viewpoints, though in demise in current legal education,
can be- revived with topics that present opportunities for legal
controversy in a respectful, intellectual, and challenging fashion. This
is particularly possible in teaching family law.
III. FAMILY LAw EDUCATION AS AN ENTRY POINT FOR
THE CLASH OF IDEALS
Family law legal education reform has been an important
topic of discussion in the legal academy since at least 2006.60
Methodology for family law legal education has been under serious
reconsideration and experienced significant advancement as a result.6 1
Yet, we have found that one particular area of law remains one-sided,
nearly universally and unilaterally, in its presentation in family law
casebooks-abortion.6 2
59. Id at 440.
60. See generally Mary E. O'Connell & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Family Law Education
Reform Project Final Report, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 524 (2006).
61. See generally FAMILY LAW EDUCATION REFORM PROJECT, http://flerproject.org (last
visited Oct. 9, 2012).
62. At the outset, we acknowledge that our critical review of family law casebooks is not
perfect. Like all professors, we have our own values, preferences, and experiences that affect our
assessments. In particular, we both are very critical of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its
progeny (the three dozen other major Supreme Court decisions about abortion), particularly the
judicially-created doctrine that the Constitution of the United States mandates that all states must
allow abortion on demand. We have studied and written about abortion jurisprudence, which has
also served to confirm our views. We have personally witnessed and experienced to some degree
the kind of ideological hostility to counter-majoritarian positions on abortion and other
controversial family law topics that we have discussed. We both also have prepared and taught
from our own materials and are the authors or co-author of relatively minor family law casebooks
or materials. See infra note 64. Moreover, apart from our own anecdotal observations, our review
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Good teaching reflects the interests, values, preferences,
beliefs, talents, and experience of the teacher. Good professors
profess, and they need teaching material that supplements,
complements and counter-balances their own preferences. Thus, no
single casebook is ideal for all professors; inevitably, in every
casebook there is likely something disappointing or less than ideal for
nearly every professor teaching the subject. However, every course
seems to need a casebook,63 so the professor must choose one.64 Every
casebook tends to possess its own angle, identity, or theme, fighting
for a share in the marketplace of legal education. In a perfect world,
the market would result in a variety of casebooks, each with a
different perspective or approach. However, when nearly every
casebook in a field65 tends to deny or reject a particular viewpoint on
a controversial legal issue, that may be evidence that the market is
of the treatment of abortion in six family law casebooks relied primarily upon reports prepared
and data compiled by the Prolife Center at the University of St. Thomas. On the other hand, our
assessment reflects a combined total of about fifty years of our own teaching experience, and it
was confirmed by our discussion with the other participants in the November 15-16, 2011
conference. See Prolife Center at the University of St. Thomas, Academic Treatment of Abortion
and Euthanasia in Leading Family Law Textbooks, 6 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 35
(2011) [hereinafter St. Thomas, Academic Treatment].
63. "Reliance on the casebook method is the hallmark of traditional legal education .
Susan B. Apel, No More Casebooks: Using Simulation-Based Learning to Educate Future Family
Law Practitioners, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 700, 701 (2011) (though adding, the casebook method "is
primarily a passive way of learning that removes the students as far as possible from the realities
of law practice.").
64. The casebook method of teaching has been referred to as legal education's "signature
pedagogy." WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAw 23 (2007). When no casebook is satisfactory, often a law professor develops
his or her own casebook or materials. That is precisely what we have done-Lynn Wardle with his
co-authored text, LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FAMILY LAW (2d ed. 2006), and Lynne Marie Kohm with a virtual casebook that is delivered
electronically and undergoes constant improvement and change. See LYNNE MARIE KOHM,
FAMILY LAW VIRTUAL CASEBOOK (2011) (on file with author). It would be an educated guess
that we are not alone in not finding the perfect casebook (including our own).
65. The casebooks reviewed for the working conference on prolife efforts in the legal
academy convened by Professor Teresa Collett on November 15-16, 2011, at the University of St.
Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis, sponsored by Our Sunday Visitor and hosted by the
Prolife Center at the University of St. Thomas and the University of St. Thomas Journal of Law &
Public Policy, included and were limited to PETER N. SWISHER, ANTHONY MILLER & JANA B.
SINGER, FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (2ded. 1998); HOMER H. CLARK, JR.
& ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND PROBLEMS (6th ed. 2000); D. KELLY
WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 2010); LESLIE JOAN
HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 2010); IRA MARK
ELLMAN, PAUL M. KURTZ, ELIZABETH S. SCoTT, LOIS A. WEITHORN & BRIAN H. Bix, FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS (4th ed. 2004); and DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN,
CATHERINE J. Ross & DAVID D. MEYER, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW (2d ed. 2009). See also
St. Thomas, Academic Treatment, supra note 62.
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skewed. As noted above in part II, there is abundant evidence that the
legal academy has a strong leftward tilt.
Moreover, when one particular viewpoint is largely neglected
in most of the major casebooks in a field, the clash of ideas may be
compromised. As Professors Beth Burkstrand-Reid, June Carbone,
and Jennifer S. Hendricks have recently observed, it is a worthwhile
goal in any family law course to remain "open to intellectual
exploration of the legal regime" surrounding family law topics.66
While professors should advocate the policies they think are
best, they also should demonstrate a commitment to the inclusive
clash-of-ideas principle of academic freedom and to the adversary
process that gives each side an opportunity to be heard. An adherence
to the clash-of-ideas pedagogy in a family law course would require a
candid and somewhat comprehensive review of all viewpoints
regarding the treatment of family relational and life issues.6 7 Any
exclusionary predisposition in abortion coverage in family-law texts
can tend toward a sense of ideological isolation and might work to
discredit a text as incomplete and biased. We submit that it is a
worthwhile goal in any family law course to openly explore all facets
of abortion as substantive legal doctrine for a myriad of benefits that
enhance legal education. Sadly, most family law casebooks do not.
A. EXAMPLES OF THE BIAS FAVORING ABORTION AS THE NORMATIVE
DEFAULT POSITION
Family law casebooks generally address abortion
jurisprudence relatively extensively, using section titles that
disconnect abortion from family law and the relationships it
66. Beth Burkstrand-Reid, June Carbone & Jennifer S. Hendricks, Teaching Controversial
Topics, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 678, 678 (2011) (discussing strategies for teaching controversial family
law topics, focused more particularly on teaching reproductive rights and gender issues in an
open, sensitive, inclusive, and productive manner).
67. Initially, we were asked to consider life issues on both ends of the spectrum of life-at
the beginning of life and at the end of life-as they were presented in family law casebooks. Two
texts did include a landmark end-of-life family decision-making case, Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), as a note case. See HARRIS, CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note
65, at 151-52; CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 65, at 472-73. Another text included a detailed
discussion of the euthanasia issue. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 65, at 92-100. See
also St. Thomas, Academic Treatment, supra note 62. Though we felt that issues of euthanasia
often affect ongoing family relationships, a topic which may be included in family law course
offerings, we agreed that abortion was a more central issue to family law subject matter and
focused our attentions strictly on beginning-of-life issues, leaving end-of-life issues to other more
appropriate courses such as elder law, health care law, and bioethics.
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regulates. Broad titles such as Reproductive Rights and Interests" and
Abortion, Contraception, and Sterilization6 were used broadly to
discuss abortion jurisprudence, but the context of family law was
somewhat detached. These titles and subheadings worked to
effectively disconnect abortion from the family relationships it
affects.
The problem of bias in substantive presentation of legal
principles surrounding abortion is apparent not only in presenting
abortion as unconnected to family relations, but in position labeling,
which sets a tone of one-sidedness that is decidedly pro-abortion.
Word choice was primary in this regard.70 "Rather than referring to
the pro-life side as 'pro-life,' many texts more often referred to that
group as 'anti-abortion.'" 7' Motherhood also is not a well-used word
in the abortion section of family law casebooks. Rather, Having
Children: The Alternative Choices is a more accepted
categorization.7 2
Comprehensive analysis of abortion jurisprudence was nearly
nonexistent. One casebook explored criticisms of the Supreme
Court's abortion jurisprudence in Roe v. Waden7 and a discussion of
fetal rights;74 and one other covered harm to women from abortion,
both of which were presented in a manner that offered some clash of
ideals furthering the legal analysis of abortion law.75 That casebook
had several shorter notes attempting to provoke inquiries into the
criticism of judicial activism in Roe.76 "While the citations of these
critiques are notable within these two texts, the discussion of these
topics was comparatively short, and edited to such an extent it was
difficult to fully explore the criticisms of pro-choice arguments."7 A
balanced analytical approach was otherwise absent from most texts.
68. See HARRIS, CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 65 at 134.
69. See CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 65, at 162.
70. "The bias in the texts also presents itself in the language and phrases chosen to convey
the issues and the conflicting sides." St. Thomas, Academic Treatment, supra note 62 at 53
(prepared for the conference). The accompanying chart in that manuscript also further illustrates
with precise detail the cases and articles discussed in each casebook (on file with Teresa Collett).
7 1. Id.
72. See, e.g., SWISHER, MILLER & SINGER, supra note 65, at 252 (using the heading Having
Children: The Alternative Choices).
73. See CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 65, at 178-79.
74. See id. at 179.
75. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 65, at 51 (citing legal scholarship detailing the
harm to women abortion causes).
76. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 65, at 30-31.
77. St. Thomas, Academic Treatment, supra note 62 at 53.
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Generally, legal opinions favoring protection of prenatal life
over abortion were treated with a tone of ridicule, rather than
professionalism and respect.78  For an example of what seemed
commonly accepted, one casebook provided a summary of the
abortion jurisprudence in Gonzales v. Carhart79 by including four
paragraphs of the majority opinion, a brief description of a
concurrence, and approximately eight paragraphs from a dissent."
One casebook characterized this abortion-regulating decision with the
subheading Burdens on Privacy." Another casebook included similar
excerpts, restraining a discussion of abortion's limits.82 Parental
notification and parental consent laws were challenged in several
casebooks," and discussions of informed consent laws seemed to
treat the choice of motherhood with some serious disregard.8 4 Bias
was prevalent in casebook "notes selected to further illuminate the
jurisprudence and controversy surrounding the cases.""
These obvious efforts to discuss abortion in a one-sided and
advocatory manner seem to deny the robust public debate that is
taking place in state law, 6in American public discourse," and
somewhat in legal academics." Family law casebooks' promotional
78. See, e.g., id. For further examples, see generally id.
79. 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (limiting late term partial-birth abortions and upholding the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003).
80. ABRAMS, CAHN, ROSS & MEYER, supra note 65, at 224-27. For more detail, see St.
Thomas, Academic Treatment, supra note 62 at 35.
81. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 65, at 39.
82. See, e.g., HARRIS, CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 65, at 136-38 (including small
excerpts from the Gonzales opinion and several paragraphs from Ginsburg's dissent).
83. See, e.g., ELLMAN, KuRTz, SCOTT, WEITHORN & Btx, supra note 65, at 1255-69.
84. See, e.g., WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 65, at 33 (focusing on arguments that pro-
choice proponents' embrace of progressive objectives as preferable to "abortion opponents" view
of "motherhood ... [as] the most fulfilling role that a woman can have" (citing KRISTEN LUKER,
ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 118, 159-60 (1984)).
85. See St. Thomas, Academic Treatment, supra note 62 at 52.
86. See, e.g., Guttmacher Inst., An Overview of Abortion Law, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF
(Mar. 21, 2012), http:// www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib OAL.pdf.
87. Robin Abcarian, Antiabortion Measures Flooding State Legislatures, L.A. TIMES (May
8, 2011), http://articles. latimes.com/201 I/may/08/nation/la-na-abortion-legislation-20110508.
88. See, e.g., DOROTHY MCBRIDE STETSON, ABORTION POLITICS, WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS,
AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATE FEMINISM (2001); Erin Daly,
Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 86 n.34 (1995) (discussing the Court's attitude in the Casey opinion
as "condescension" and "marginalization" of women and the extent of the scope of their interests);
Natalie Langlois, Note, Life-Sustaining Treatment Law: A Model for Balancing a Woman's
Reproductive Rights with a Pharmacist's Conscientious Objection, 47 B.C. L. REV. 815 (2006);
Ann Cary, University Faculty for Life Conference at Notre Dame Fosters Pro-Life Scholarship,
TODAY'S CATHOLIC NEWS (June 29, 2011),
http://www.todayscatholicnews.org/2011/06/university-faculty-for-life-conference-at-notre-dame-
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treatment of pro-abortion jurisprudence as the normative default
position for pregnancy not only denies the legal realties of the day but
also deprives law students of a comprehensive and open legal
education.
B. WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO TEACH THE CLASH OF IDEALS IN FAMILY
LAW
Students can be shortchanged in developing their analytical
skills when presented only one side of the abortion controversy. In
the genuine clash of ideals, it seems at least intellectually honest and
academically respectable to present both sides of the legal debate on
abortion. Teaching the controversy can be an instructor's ally.
Furthermore, scholarly strength and analytical depth is more easily
achieved by presenting conflicting views of any particular area of
law. Even if an instructor considers any matter, including abortion
jurisprudence, a legal fait accomplit, he or she might find great
benefit from teaching all sides of it as a legal issue. Teaching the
debate on any particular area of law helps an instructor to bring out
the nuances of the law's application. Rather than simply stating the
general rule, teaching the exceptions, accompanying regulatory
schemes, and different approaches to that regulation can be
immensely valuable. Family law professors deprive their students of
the opportunity to be challenged when a minority view or the nuances
of law are excluded from discussion.
Presenting material in conflict is also a much more effective
way of training a student in essay exam writing and memorandum or
brief preparation. In quality legal training it is most common to
present majority and minority views when states are free to regulate
certain areas of law. As evidenced by Casey and its progeny, abortion
is one of those areas. A discussion of abortion jurisprudence can be
greatly enriched by regulatory comparisons, its connections to
relationships within the family, and how the law operates in domestic
relations of any state family law scheme. The dilemma presented by
abortion bias in family law casebooks offers an opportunity to put
forward some potential solutions to this current state of academic
affairs.
fosters-pro-life-scholarship/.
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IV. SOLUTIONS FOR PRESENTATION OF THE ABORTION
CONTROVERSY IN FAMILY LAW
Family law is a rich area of legal education overflowing with
opportunity to train lawyers in preparation of all sides of a legal
issue. A family law course can be fertile ground for these alternative
teaching methods, particularly in covering the topic of abortion fairly
to effectively train legal advocates. Even without current casebook
amendment, the objectives can be attained. This paper offers some
central methods and themes by which a family law instructor may
approach the abortion controversy without compromising either the
legal jurisprudence or the process of legal education.
A. CONSIDER TEACHING FAMILY LAW VIA STATUTORY STATE CODE
Though federal abortion jurisprudence may appear to some
lawyers and law professors to be settled law, regulation of family law
and domestic relations is based in and directed by statutory state
code.8 9 Regulation of abortion in a variety of states is not only
permissible90 but is in continuous transformation. Teaching family
law via state statutory code opens a wide array of opportunities for
legal training in family law regulation. For example, Mississippi
voters recently rejected a state constitutional amendment on
personhood.91 South Dakota law requires that a pregnant woman be
told she has an "existing relationship" with her fetus before going
through with an abortion.92 Louisiana has numerous restrictions on
abortion just added this year, and that state is not alone in increasing
abortion regulations.93 Many states restrict abortion by requiring
89. "[F]amily matters are not among the enumerated powers of the federal government...
.[S]tate legislatures have traditionally defined the family and enacted the laws that regulate
marriage, parentage, divorce, family support obligations, and family property rights." HARRY D.
KRAUSE, LINDA D. ELROD, MARSHA GARRISON & J. THOMAS OLDHAM, FAMILY LAW: CASES,
COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 19 (5th ed. 2003).
90. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873-74 (1992).
91. See Mississippi's "Personhood Amendment" Fails at Polls, CBS NEWS (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/ 8301-250_162-57321126/mississippis-personhood-amendment-fails-at-
polls/.
92. See Ted Mann, Appeals Court Upholds South Dakota Abortion Law, ATLANTIC WIRE
(Sept. 3, 2011), http://www. theatlanticwire.com/national/2011/09/appeals-court-upholds-south-
dakota-abortion-law/42087/.
93. Meteor Blades, Louisiana Adds to This Year's Huge Spike in Abortion Legislation,
DAILY KOS (June 24, 2011), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/06/24/988070/-Louisiana-adds-
to-this-years-huge-spike-in-anti-abortion-legislation.
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parental notification or consent, waiting period requirements,
informed consent, and a host of other regulations.94 Students might be
invited to critique and defend such laws. One instructor of an
advanced legal research course has developed detailed supplemental
materials in this regard.95
Students can better learn the many facets of the abortion issue
by doing their own state statutory research, particularly of states they
hope to practice law in in the future. That statutory research can also
include state and federal case law decisions regarding the
interpretation of those statutes. In this way, a law student can analyze
his or her home state's trends in abortion regulation.6 In that process,
more abortion jurisprudence is available for student analysis,
naturally presenting a fuller picture of the abortion controversy. This
choice of primary materials for student learning reflects an essence of
non-traditional teaching and learning.97 When discussing this
solution, we (the co-authors) discovered that both of us have used this
method in our basic family law course for years because we had
independently determined it to be a very effective method of legal
training in an area that is state regulated. 5 Professional skills learned
in this way are very useful making this an excellent technique of legal
training and law-practice preparation."
94. See generally Guttmacher Inst., supra note 86; see also Teresa Stanton Collett,
Transporting Minors for Immoral Purposes: The Case for the Child Custody Protection Act & the
Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 107, 108 (2006); Teresa Stanton
Collett, Protecting Our Daughters: The Need for the Vermont Parental Notification Law, 26 VT.
L. REV. 101, 106-07 (2001).
95. See George Jackson, Researching State Abortion Laws: A Pathfinder for Advocates,
Policymakers and Attorneys 7-37 (October 6, 2003), available at www.tc.umn.edu/-g-
jack/pathfinders/S03_list4.doc (last visited October 27, 2012). Though not designed for a family
law course, Professor Jackson's methods would be easily transferrable to such a course
nonetheless.
96. This process also allows and encourages the student to prepare for the actual practice of
law in a state jurisdiction.
97. Apel, supra note 63, at 701 (discussing her own General Practice Program for teaching
domestic relations where her syllabus dictates that students will work with primary materials from
the Vermont Code).
98. See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, Family Law Syllabus 2 (Fall 2011) (stating "Students will
demonstrate how to analyze and assess both the nature and the regulation of marriage, family,
divorce, and parenting from a statutory perspective by preparing a statutory outline of the family
law code in their chosen state jurisdiction."). The practical result is that, for example in abortion
regulation, students will be able to apply the law of their state jurisdiction to any family law
abortion controversy, providing a more thorough analysis of the issues and rules at stake in a
given dilemma.
99. For a discussion of the importance of teaching skills in a Family Law course, see Andrew
Schepard & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Hofstra's Family Law with Skills Course: Implementing FLER
(the Family Law Education Reform Project), 49 FAM. CT. REV. 685 (2011) (detailing how a
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This method also fosters the development of practical skills
valued in the esteemed Carnegie, MacCrate, and Best Practices
reports. 00 Students benefit from learning the skills that are required to
work with state statutory material as a primary resource, those
necessary practical skills are further honed in this manner even in a
doctrinal course.
B. CONSIDER USING A RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK TO TEACH FAMILY
LAW
Teaching family law from a relational perspective naturally
provides a means to teach abortion from a variety of standpoints, and,
of course, family law is an ideal subject to teach with a focus on
relational aspects of the law. An abortion controversy is often raised
by the relationships within a family. For example, a comprehensive
approach to family law conflicts can be achieved by presenting
abortion in the relational context of a parent's right to direct the
upbringing of a child and the mature minor's right to abortion."o' The
best interests of the child can dictate the standard for the treatment of
a child's protection by parents, in every context except that of
personal autonomy where a best interest showing would justify
judicial bypass.102 A family member who can gain rights and liberty
interests via family structure may conflict with the personhood of a
fetus.103 Parental autonomy may conflict with the interests held by
prenatal children.'" One might ask whether abortion is a form of
child abuse.
Conflicts between parents within a family are presented by a
mother's and father's conflicting rights when the abortion choice is or
is not informed or exercised. Coerced abortion in the context of
family law skills course is designed and conducted for a better legal education of future family
law practitioners).
100. See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 100-20; Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST
PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 33 (2007); LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) (The MacCrate Report).
101. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle's approach in his section entitled Non-economic Relations.
Wardle, supra note 64, at 550-51 (discussing Supreme Court cases about minors' abortion
decisions).
102. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1997).
103. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
493-94 (1983), and later progeny, upholding most state attempts to preserve the life of the fetus.
104. See Wardle, supra note 64, at 440-41 (Father's Autonomy and Interest in Prenatal
Children).
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domestic violence and child abuse are obvious examples of how
interpersonal family conflict can bring out the nuances of
fundamental liberty interests. Furthermore, the interplay between
state regulation of the family and federal regulation of the family may
further demonstrate the significance and importance of individual
rights within a family context. Thus, using a relational framework to
teach family law can be helpful in developing the many angles of the
abortion decision as it affects family members.
C. CONSIDER USING A COURSE SUPPLEMENT TO HIGHLIGHT ALL ANGLES
OF ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
Law professors wishing to handle the law on abortion more fairly
may also wish to provide a supplement to students to balance the
casebook. Such a supplement might include opposing briefs in a high
profile abortion case. Opposing briefs present a relatively thorough
review of the arguments on both sides of the matter. Other
supplemental materials would include law journal articles that
compare positions or presenting two journal articles of opposing
views.
Professor Samuel W. Calhoun in his preparation for a two-hour
seminar entitled The Abortion Controversy prepared a weekly packet
of supplemental materials for use in that course. "The packet, drawn
from a variety of sources-books, law review articles, magazines,
newspapers, etc.-and maintaining a balance between prochoice and
prolife viewpoints, served as the raw material for our discussions
(supplemented by video materials that I placed on reserve in the
library)."o'0 There, the supplement was the core of the course
materials.
A supplement would be an easy solution to the casebook problem
we highlight here, stimulating both student and instructor to a depth
of analysis generally not attained from casebook material. Not only
might it be prepared by individual family law teachers, but a
publisher might offer such material to all interested family law
professors. Alternatively, it might be available to scholarly
organizations that focus on pro-life issues, such as University Faculty
for Life.
105. Samuel W. Calhoun, Impartiality in the Classroom: A Personal Account of a Struggle to
Be Evenhanded in Teaching About Abortion, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 99, 100-01 (1995).
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D. WORK THE ADVANTAGES OF TEACHING THE DEBATE
Teaching the debate on any particular area of law helps an
instructor to bring out the nuances of the law's application.
Presenting material in conflict is also an effective way of training a
student in essay exam writing and memorandum or brief preparation.
In quality legal education, presentation not only of the current
majority view is expected, but also presentation of responsible
alternative views that may influence the development of the law,
especially state family law. Abortion is one of those areas. 106
In his article Teaching Harbeson, Professor David K. DeWolf
discusses how he takes advantage of the many perspectives presented
by a wrongful birth case,"' not only for its substance but for the
nuances it presents as well as the challenges it presented to him as a
teacher and a father of a Down syndrome daughter:"'
One of the benefits . ... is in seeing how one's views
on the merits of ideologically polarizing issues may
not translate easily into a legal rule. At the same time,
observing the way in which a legal rule plays out may
lead to reflection on the truth of basic principles that
we might be inclined to assume are self-evident.'
We understand that teaching a legal perspective that you are
personally opposed to is no easy task. Indeed, Professor Calhoun
recounts this difficulty: "As a prolife person striving to be
evenhanded in teaching about abortion, I bear an especially heavy
responsibility to know and to present the prochoice side of the
debate."" 0 Presenting the abortion controversy in an intellectually
stimulating and honest manner was a challenge:"'
106. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874-75 (allowing state regulation of abortion).
107. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (involving a lawsuit over the
connection between the drug Dilantin and the subsequent birth of two Down syndrome children).
108. David K. DeWolf, Teaching Harbeson, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 527, 527-29 (2004).
109. Id at 530. Professor DeWolf adds:
[I]t reminds me for one brief shining moment that for every name in a casebook, often a victim of
some horrific injury or humiliating experience, there is a real person out there ..... [W]e who
teach law weave in and out of the mysteries of love and suffering, parenthood and death.... The
intimacy we experience with our students must be treated with respect, but also with the same
astonishment at our own absurdity that the intimacy of sexuality evokes.
Id. at 532.
110. Calhoun, supra note 105, at I 10.
111. See id. at 100-02 (describing that process).
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I do not consider the course as a soapbox for me to
proselytize about abortion. Rather, my chief goal is to
challenge all students, regardless of their position on
the issue, to think more deeply. This will require that
the very best arguments on both sides be presented
and evaluated.
An important secondary goal is to ensure that
the seminar demonstrate the possibility of discussing
this most controversial issue in a calm and respectful
manner. I hope that the atmosphere will be such that
each participant will actually hear other points of view
before rushing to assert his/her own.112
The advantages of teaching the debate allow an instructor to
be "open to intellectual exploration of the legal regime surrounding"
the topic."' Simultaneously, teaching the abortion debate can be
uncomfortable and evoke strong emotional feelings, presenting
sensitive fertile ground for classroom controversy. Professors
Burkstrand-Reid, Carbone, and Hendricks suggest having a plan for
difficult discussions that sets clear expectations regarding classroom
behavior, discussion decorum, and mutual respect.14 "When it comes
to presenting a topic that you expect (or have just discovered) to be
controversial, you will want to present all sides of the argument.""'
They suggest that shifting the focus of the controversy may be quite
helpful in teaching any controversial subject. "[E]xplicitly shifting
your analytical framework away from rights and wrongs and favoring
a different approach of analysis" may be helpful."'6 Rather than
making categorical assertions derived from political talking points,
students and professors may want to consider methodically exploring
112. Id. at l01.
113. Burkstrand-Reid, Carbone & Hendricks, supra note 66, at 678.
114. See id at 679-80 (discussing how to lay the ground work for a healthy, respectful
environment for learning in the courses description, in marketing the course, and in conducting the
course).
115. Id. at 681. The authors go on to offer specific classroom strategies and resources. Id. at
681-84.
116. Id.at683.
For example, Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v. Texas both involved challenges to
prior precedent (Roe v. Wade and Bowers v. Hardwick, respectively). Class discussion could focus
on the importance of precedent in new challenges to abortion rights, specifically using the
Lawrence case as an example of reversal of an outmoded opinion. Id.
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the implications of both kinds of arguments, which helps students to
"slow down their judgment and develop a more complex
understanding" of the law."' It is important for any instructor to
apply his or her approach to both sides of the argument so as to avoid
consequently ridiculing one side of the debate."
A responsible, respectful debate-focused approach may be
aided if the professor sometimes plays the "devil's advocate" and
presents strong arguments contrary to his or her own positions. That
may have the effect of encouraging less personal polarization in the
discussion. Similarly, students might be randomly invited to assert
the best arguments they can think of for the various sides of a
controversial issue to encourage appreciation of professional
perspectives.
The advantages of teaching the debate can be particularly
rewarding in teaching abortion in family law subject matter. It does
require honest self-reflection and pedagogical re-examination,"9 but
can work to produce active, engaged, and robust learning. We believe
this will inspire better doctrinal learning and can lay a foundation for
lifetime professional learning.
E. CONSIDER EXPOSING STUDENTS TO ABORTION MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION FOR PROTECTION OF WOMEN
An interdisciplinary approach is generally welcomed in
teaching areas of family law. Family law easily integrates with
criminal law in domestic violence, contract law in marital
agreements, property law in equitable distribution, and social science
in areas of a child's best interests. Tort law is another area of
integration that relates not only to injury within a family but injury to
a particular family member from abortion. Lawyering skills and state
regulation of abortion can come together in a comprehensive
approach to abortion that seeks to protect women, their bodies, and
their legal rights.
Personal injuries to women in the abortion procedure need not
be hidden from student view, but can be used to teach methods of
compensation to injured women that can foster deterrence from
117. Id. at 683.
118. Id. at 684.
119. Id
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future bodily injury to women undergoing legal abortion. This allows
the instructor to develop additional aspects of abortion and its legal
effects on the family. Even if a course syllabus cannot provide a great
deal of time to the particulars of abortion malpractice as serious
personal injury litigation, it can be important to expose family law
students to the existence of abortion malpractice, the process, and its
benefits to women and their families when a woman is injured by
abortion.
F. APPRECIATE THE SCHOLARLY BENEFITS OF TEACHING THE ABORTION
CONTROVERSY
Finally, the scholarly benefits of an instructor's ability to
consider and present both sides can be profound. An instructor's
scholarship enriches his or her teaching; likewise, teaching enhances
scholarship. Scholarly depth is more easily achieved by presenting
conflicting views of any particular area of law. Even if an instructor
considers the matter a legal fait accomplit, he or she might find great
benefit from teaching the historical perspective of what preceded the
current "settled" decision or law. Offering a prospective view of
current and possible future events can also enhance pluralistic
teaching to afford benefits to scholarship. Likewise, a comparative
law perspective discussing how abortion issues are treated in other
legal systems (in Europe, Asia, Africa, Islamic nations, etc.) can
provide valuable and broadening depth-perception about issues that
in a parochial pond may seem to be obvious or settled.
Additional benefits lie in professional identity formation.
Both the Carnegie'2 0 and Best Practicesl2 ' reports implicate the need
for law schools to promote professional identity initiatives that assist
in healthy lawyering ethics and professionalism.'2 2  The
recommendations of these reports encourage law schools to make
professional identity formation a larger component of the law school
experience.123 Teaching abortion as a controversy allows a student to
focus on integrating professional identity training in law school.
120. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 30.
121. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 100, at 33.
122. See Melissa Yatsko, The Stakes of Professional Identity Formation: Why Integration Is
Needed, LEGAL PEDAGOGY (Nov. 17, 2011).
123. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE ECHO CHAMBER
Dean Roger Cramton wrote of "the ordinary religion of the law
school classroom," which conveys "certain fundamental value
assumptions unconsciously presupposed by most faculty and student
participants" that "lurks behind what is said and done."l24 The serious
imbalance in the presentation of legal policy analysis and arguments
relating to profound issues about abortion in some family law
casebooks suggests that, formal commitment to academic freedom
notwithstanding, the common religion of such law school teaching
materials is biased against pro-life views and lacks serious
commitment to the core legal process values of inclusion, diversity,
pluralism, and respect for the clash of competing values and
viewpoints. If law students "hunger[]" for mature examples on which
they can model their approach and conduct,'25 they are being
shortchanged by the model of professionalism presented in such
casebooks. Those casebooks demonstrate a "social engineer" model
of lawyers as "specialists in manipulation"1 26 rather than truly
committed to the ideal of inclusive, pluralistic academic freedom, and
adversarial legal process values.
The problems of exclusionary bias against pro-life viewpoints
in family law casebooks used in American law schools is just one
facet of a tilted concept of "academic freedom" in American
universities that marginalizes and often excludes faith-based morality
arguments. 127 It is particularly disadvantageous in legal education
because the "clash of competing viewpoints" is the environment in
which lawyers practice the skills that they are expected to have begun
to learn while in law school. We still live in times in which the sharp
124. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247,247 (1978).
125. Id at 259.
126. Id
127. Professor Marsden also suggests the need for institutions where the minority viewpoints
are generally accepted. His second suggestion is:
Americans should also be building pluralism among institutions of higher
learning. . . . Instead of following the pattern of having nonsectarian national
standards set by a dominant establishment and then classing dissenting
religious perspectives as at best second-rate, it should be recognized that
religiously defined points of view can be intellectually as responsible as
nonreligious ones.
MARSDEN, supra note 21, at 439.
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clash of competing viewpoints drive most of the major global
developments and provide the inescapable setting in which critical
decisions must be made in our country and in our world.128 There is a
great need to train lawyers who are equipped with skills that allow
them to operate at a high level of competence in an atmosphere of
strongly-advocated, divergent, competing ideas.
Crafting a solution to the problem of exclusionary bias against
pro-life viewpoints in family law casebooks is a challenging task.
Some cures may be just as bad (or just as inconsistent with the
academic freedom goal of presenting a clash of ideas) as the
problems they try to remedy.129 Nevertheless, it is important to
attempt to remedy the lack of viewpoint diversity that diminishes
academic freedom in law school. That flaw deprives law students of
important exposure to perspectives that would enrich their
educational experiences, would better prepare them to address
competing views about very controversial social policies, and thus
would better prepare them to be effective lawyers. '"
Professor Marsden suggests several steps that would be
helpful to remedy the flawed, exclusionary, and contemporary
version of "academic freedom." While his particular focus is on
tolerance of the expression of religious viewpoints in universities
generally, his suggestions are applicable to the broader concern of
inclusion of other non-dominant (generally conservative, especially
pro-life) viewpoints, expressions and teaching materials in law
schools. Two of his recommendations are directly applicable to the
128. Compare Ali Khan, Islam as Intellectual Property "My Lord! Increase Me in
Knowledge," 31 CUMB. L. REv. 631, 632-35 (2001) (reviewing views of Islam that clash and
trigger conflict with Christian, Jewish, and western secular thought), with Alexander, supra note
30, at 67-68 (noting the clash of ideologies that stimulated the increase of critical analytical
thinking in legal education).
129. For example:
[t]he [Academic Bill of Rights] has been denounced by numerous faculty
groups and the American Association of University Professors as a violation
of the principles of academic freedom. There are three chief elements that
elicit faculty ire. First, the [Academic Bill of Rights] places a duty on faculty
to present a diversity of views on controversial subjects covered in class.
Second, it directs schools to hire faculty members to foster "a plurality of
methodologies and perspectives." Third, institutions are directed to establish
procedures for implementing these and other principles.
Byrne, supra note 15, at 942.
130. Effective lawyers are concerned for justice; Marsden notes, "Americans who are
concerned for justice ought to be open to considering alternatives." MARSDEN, supra note 21, at
440.
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concern about the presentation of pro-life perspectives in family law
casebooks.
"A first step is that religiously committed scholars who are
already present at many universities will have to overcome their own
longstanding inhibitions about relating faith to scholarship and
establish academic credibility for expressed religious viewpoints.""'
Thus, professors who support the minority'3 2 pro-life views on
various legal issues need to produce high-quality scholarship about
those issues (such as relating to when life begins, the "personhood"
debate, whether unborn fetuses and embryos are family members
["children"], the respective interests in protecting the life of the pre-
natal child in utero of different members of the family, whether
abortion is a form of child abuse, the rights of mother and father of
the proposed target of the abortion, the rights of the parents of
teenagers seeking abortions, etc.) These professors must refuse to be
silenced and excluded and must persist in quality academic
production.
Second, "[o]ther faculty members, in turn, should be receptive
to the ideas of individual scholars whose religious perspective may
frankly influence aspects of their work . . . ."I3 There must be more
recognition of pro-life views in family law casebooks. This would
take the form of casebooks presenting such viewpoints, information,
and arguments; summarizing them; citing them; and including
reference to criticisms of the currently dominant pro-abortion or pro-
choice views that are well-presented by pro-life scholars and
professionals.
131. See id at 439.
132. Though the prolife position may not be the minority viewpoint of the general American
public, see Lydia Saad, More Americans "Pro-Life" than "Pro-Choice "for First Time, GALLUP
POLITICS (May 15, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/l 18399/more-americans-pro-life-than-pro-
choice-first-time.aspx, it is not unfair to state that abortion rights are apparently the majority view
in the legal academy as reflected in the official position of the American Bar Association favoring
abortion rights, see, e.g., Miers Pushed ABA on Abortion, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 3, 2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,171103,00.html, and the casebooks used in law schools
which were the subject of the efforts of the Conference that triggered this article. See St. Thomas,
Academic Treatment, supra note 62, at 35. See also Prolife Center at the University of St.
Thomas, Academic Treatment of Abortion and Euthanasia in Leading Bioethics Textbooks, 6 U.
ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 54, 54 (2011); Prolife Center at the University of St. Thomas,
Academic Treatment of Abortion and Euthanasia in Leading Constitutional Law Textbooks, 6 U.
ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 11, 11 (2011).
133. See MARSDEN, supra note 21, at 439 ("Like other American groups, religiously
committed scholars and institutions should not be discriminated against on the basis of cultural
stereotypes.").
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A lack of intellectual diversity results from the echo-chamber
effect where a community hears only itself, the ideas it wants and
expects to hear, and nothing but echoes of the information,
arguments, and viewpoints it prefers. It is difficult for a teacher to see
him or herself in an echo chamber; outside views, however, can
always be helpful not only to the one trapped in the chamber, but to
those listening to him or her teach. Echo-chamber instructors become
limited in effectiveness. These degenerative qualities are evident in
family law casebooks' treatment of abortion jurisprudence. Stepping
out of the echo chamber by using some of the suggestions made here
can assist a family law teacher to be a more effective and complete
teacher of the law.
Students can be shortchanged in developing their analytical
skills when presented only one side of the abortion controversy in
any format. Teaching the controversy can be an instructor's ally, no
matter his or her persuasion on abortion. This essay has demonstrated
how that is possible in a family law course framework. When a
family law teacher steps out of the echo chamber by using some of
the suggestions made here, that process can also increase a student's
professional skill development in significant ways. Echo chambers
are not good places in which to train lawyers who will work in
environments that, unlike echo chambers, are discordant, where
numerous diverse ideas, assertions, arguments, interests, and
viewpoints compete and strive for attention and influence. Law
students need to learn how to be effective advocates in environments
in which many different, discordant, competing viewpoints are
present, and in which they are trained to recognize, respect, respond
to, and effectively deal with such competitive viewpoint pluralism.
However, family law casebooks are like echo chambers and do not
generally present a complete, comprehensive, or even adequately fair
review of viewpoint pluralism regarding elective abortion.
An understanding of the importance of the clash of ideas in
the search for truth, and respect for the view that such intellectual
diversity is important in legal education, is necessary for academic
rigor. Happily, these ideals seem to be experiencing revival,
particularly in pragmatic and identity-formation teaching in law
schools. The profound and pervasive echo effect in law school
teaching of abortion issues in family law courses can be avoided and
remedied in law schools.
The learning process that can take place for both professor
and student can be simultaneously challenging, humbling,
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stimulating, and mind opening. 3 4 When the factual evidence on the
matter of abortion proves that there are different ways to think about
reproductive rights and the health of women, their children, and their
families as a matter of general view, it seems at least intellectually
honest and pedagogically pragmatic to present both sides of the legal
debate for a robust discussion of abortion law.
Finally, it is well to remember Cramton's gentle admonition:
"Law schools and legal educators are inevitably involved in the
service of values. For the most part they serve as priests of the
established order and its modem dogmas."' They best serve society
when they not only espouse what they think is the truth but when
they do the truth. The truth of the clash of ideas principle deserves to
be done in casebooks and class discussions and not merely honored
in abstract statements about academic freedom.
134. Professor Calhoun notes Professor Charles Black's response to challenging material: "I
hope I shall always have the grace of being somewhat unhappy with my teaching." See Calhoun,
supra note 105, at 112 (citing Charles L. Black, Jr., Reflections on Teaching and Working in
Constitutional Law, 66 OR. L. REv. 1, 9 (1987)).
135. Cramton, supra note 124, at 263.
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